Being and Duty. The contribution of 20th-century Polish thinkers to the theory of imperatives and norms ebook

Foreword

The book which the Reader has in front of them is composed of three parts. The first component analyses the creative contribution to the theory of imperatives and norms provided by Polish researchers in the 20th century. The second component summarizes their reflections and considerations. This constitutes the first half of the publication. The third part (and second half) is a compilation of the classic writings of Polish authors of the period and constitutes a practical illustration of the first half.

The following comments are necessary here.

The analysis – included in component one – was made via my own examination of the aforementioned intellectuals. Yet everything that I wrote was subsequently critically reviewed and commented upon by Professor Anna Brożek, whom I would sincerely like to thank as her comments prevented many of my mistakes. A certain unified net of ideas is proposed in the analysis. It allows for a comparison between different conceptions within the discussed matter – which were originally referred to under numerous different names.

Part two – the summary – is firstly and foremostly the viewpoints of each researcher presented chronologically (i.e. according to the date, when the researcher first spoke on the particular subject). Secondly, special attention is paid to these works which will not be found in component three.

The selection – part three – should provide the Reader with a representative image of Polish thought in the 20th century, within the frames indicated in the publication’s title. What matters most are the issues of what is often called “philosophy of language”. Texts presenting the original logical systems of imperatives and norms which were published in Poland in the 20th century did not find their way into the selection. One of the main reasons behind this is the fact that a comprehensive presentation of these systems would require the inclusion of the full texts in question. Those texts, usually of considerable, irreducible length, would disrupt the planned size of the book.

1. Preferential situation

The simplest preferential situation – i.e. situation of willing – consists in the following:

(1) The person A wants S[1] to occur.

The person A is THE SUBJECT of the act of willing, and S is THE OBJECT of willing (i.e. the preferred state of affairs).

The following interrelation occurs:

(2) A wants S to occur – when[2] – if S does not occur, then A will be dissatisfied.

A more complex preferential situation than (1) is the following:

(3) A wants B to cause the occurrence of S.

B is here THE AGENT performing the (object) of willing.

The preference from situation (3) is DIRECTED willing; in fact it is a particular case of situation (1). With directed acts of willing, the agent performing the act might be both the subject of the act or a different person.

Formula (2) might be considered as a definition of “(non-directed) willing”.

• The complex of psychological phenomena culminating in the act of willing and leading to the action (i.e. the act) was provisionally analysed by Borowski [1923]. He considered the initial phenomenon to be the motives of an activity, or impulses (that is, “impressions, feelings, moods, thoughts, fancies”) “judged negatively”, and therefore leading towards “liberation” from them. The motives of an activity were clearly distinguished from its aims – always positive for the performer – that is, from presenting a “certain desired future event”. Willing was perceived by Borowski as driving directed from the motive towards the aim, with the underlying conviction that the aim is reachable. In case of different motives and correlated aims – one must make a choice between them, that is between the aims to be realized.

• The term “willing” (or “volition”) was thought to be non-definable by Cheliński [1925]. According to him, volitional states are non-analysable and only perceivable when introspecting.

• Znamierowski [1957] presented a more detailed conception of willing – or in his words: driving. Generally speaking, he characterized this psychological phenomenon as follows:

Driving is, when occurring in accordance with its pattern, tension; it is supposed to trigger a certain movement reaction towards the final state of affairs [1957: 142]. Driving [...] also contains a hidden tendency to change, a movement tendency, as with the physical tension [1957: 130].

Znamierowski distinguished driving from drift – a disposition towards experiencing similar drivings.

There are several constituents of driving, according to Znamierowski:

(a) the perceptive element, an impression part of the preparatory tension;

(b) the psychological impulse, the core of driving;

(c) the scheme of the “movement tract”, where driving is realisable (i.e. where the aim of driving may be reached).

Drivings differ from one another with regard to the following aspects:

(a) quality (cf. hunger, thirst[3]etc.);

(b) reason (cf. innate or instinctive and acquired drivings);

(c) aim – that is, the point (state of affairs, object of driving) which determines the direction of driving (cf. inclination – or appulsion, i.e. positive driving towards something, and disgust or repulsion, negative driving away from something);

(d) consciousness regarding the aim (cf. conscious and unconscious drivings);

(e) instrumentality (cf. independent and dependent drivings, when we drive at something in order to acquire something else).

[1] In this work, symbols ‘S’, ‘S1’ and ‘S2’ indicate states of affaires stated by some declarative sentences; this manner of symbolization has to prevent using the formulas of the type “the fact that p” (where ‘p’ is a sentential variable), which contains the word “fact” suggesting unforunately factuality of the suitable state of affair.

[2] Here – and passim – “when” means “always and only if”.

[3] Thirst is here referred to as an equivalent of hunger, but regarding liquids; in Polish the words “thirst” and “desire” are homonyms.